State of Utah v. Alex Montiel : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
State of Utah v. Alex Montiel : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark Shurtleff; Attorney General; Karen A. Klucznik; B. Fred Burmester; Attorney for Appellee.
Lori J. Seppi; Heidi A. Buchi; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Alex Montiel, No. 20030310 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4290
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
ALEX MONTIEL, a/k/a 
JULION CEZAR RAMON-DURAN 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030310-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A 
FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-6-302 (1999), WITH A GROUP ENHANCEMENT PURSUANT 
TO Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2002), IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. 
HANSON, PRESIDING 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
NOV 2 8 2003 
Pautette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
LORI J. SEPPI 
HEIDI A. BUCHI 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
B. FRED BURMESTER 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ALEX MONTIEL, a/k/a 
JULION CEZAR RAMON-DURAN 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030310-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A 
FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-6-302 (1999), WITH A GROUP ENHANCEMENT PURSUANT 
TO Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2002), IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. 
HANSON, PRESIDING 
LORI J. SEPPI 
HEIDI A. BUCHI 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6,h Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
B. FRED BURMESTER 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
REJECTING A PLEA AGREEMENT WHICH REPRESENTED 
A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE CHARGE AND, THUS, 
DEFENDANT'S POTENTIAL SENTENCE, WHERE THE 
PROSECUTOR HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE PLEA WITH 
THE VICTIM 8 
A. This Court should reject defendant's challenges to the trial 
court's plea ruling where the court left open the possibility 
of revisiting its ruling before trial and, by strategically failing 
to take advantage of that possibility, defendant invited the 
errors of which he now complains 9 
l 
B. This Court should reject defendant's challenges to the trial 
court's plea ruling where they focus on only one of the grounds 
upon which the trial court relied below 13 
C. This Court should reject defendant's challenges to the trial 
court's plea ruling where he cannot show the court committed 
plain error in rejecting an agreement which represented a 
significant reduction in the charge and, thus, defendant's 
potential sentence, and the prosecutor had not discussed the 
plea with the victim 16 
1. General law regarding plea agreements 17 
2. Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court 
erred, let alone obviously erred, in failing to consider 
"all relevant factors" before rejecting the plea agreement. . . . 19 
3. Defendant's claim that the trial court committed plain 
error by exceeding the scope of its authority in rejecting 
the plea agreement fails where he presents no controlling 
law on the issue 29 
4. Defendant's claim that the trial court committed plain 
error by arbitrarily rejecting the plea agreement fails 
where the record does not support it 34 
5. Defendant's plain error claims fail because he cannot 
show he was prejudiced by the court's rejection of the 
plea agreement 36 
CONCLUSION 37 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Rules, Constitutional Provisions & Statutes 
Addendum B - Hearing transcript 
n 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Hockadayv. United States, 359 A.2d 146 (D.C. App. 1976) 31,36 
Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962) 18, 21 
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984) 18 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) 18 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) 17, 18 
State v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 31, 32 
United States v. Arenas-Ortiz, 339 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) 30 
United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977) 15, 26, 28, 31, 32 
United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1985) 15, 25, 28, 32, 34 
United States v. Escobar Noble, 653 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1981) 33, 34 
United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d445 (5th Cir. 2002) 15, 28, 32, 33 
United States v. Martin, 287 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002) 30, 32, 33 
United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1983) 15, 25, 28, 33, 34 
United States v. Moore, 637 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir. 1981) 26, 31 
United States v. Robertson, 45 F.,3d 1423 (10th Cir. 1995) 15,28,33 
United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42 (2nd Cir. 1986) 19,25 
United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800 (11th Cir. 2000), 
cert, denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001) 30 
United States v. Torres -Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692 (2nd Cir. 1997) . 15, 19, 25, 28, 33, 34 
iii 
STATE CASES 
Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1983) 23, 36 
Hockada v. United States, 359 A.2d 146 (D.C. App. 1976) 23 
Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998) 14, 15 
People v. Grove, 566 N.W.2d 547 (Mich. 1997) 15,26,28 
Sandy v. Fifth Judicial District Court, 935 P.2d 1148 (Nev. 1997) 31, 32 
Sparks v. State, 759 P.2d 180 (Nev. 1988) 24, 32 
Stacks v. State, 372 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. App. 1978) 24 
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996) 10, 12 
State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah App. 1998) 13, 15 
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997) 10 
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) 10, 12 
State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, 44 P.3d 756 15, 28 
State v. Clanton, 612 P.2d 662 (Kan. App. 1980) 24 
State v. Daniels, 648 A.2d 266 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1994) 31 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (1993) 1, 10, 16, 30 
State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, 53 P.3d 486, 
cert, denied, 63 P.3d 104 (Utah 2002) 17, 23, 30 
State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, 18 P.3d 1123 17,23,30 
State v. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 2001) 17, 24 
State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1995) 14, 24, 28 
iv 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 9 
State v. Jasper, 17 P.3d 807 (Colo. 2001) 26 
State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) 9 
State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, 994 P.2d 1237 13, 15 
State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988) 13, 15 
State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah App. 1989) 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 
State v. Pearson, 818 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1991) 17, 18 
State v. Reuschel, 312 A.2d 739 (Vt. 1973) 24 
State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah App. 1997) 17, 23, 30 
State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990) 13, 15 
State v. Sears, 542 S.E.2d 863 (W.Va. 2000) 25 
State v. Southworth, 52 P.3d 987, 997 (N.M. App. 2002), 
cert, denied, 52 P.3d 411 (N.M. 2002) 14,15, 28 
State v. Stirba, 872 P.2d, 918 (Utah App. 1998) 17 
State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, 17 P.3d 1153 14, 18, 19, 23, 27, 36 
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993) 13, 15 
State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188 (Utah App. 1995) 18,19,20,21,22,23,29,30 
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457 (Utah App. 1996) 9 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Const, art. I, § 28 2, 15, 28 
Utah Const. Art. V., § 1 29 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11 (Supp. 1988) 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-3 (1999 & Supp. 2003) 2, 15, 28 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-3 (1999 & Supp. 2003) 2, 15, 28 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4 (1999 & Supp.2003) 2, 15, 28 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 2002) 1 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11 passim 
VI 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
ALEX MONTIEL, a/k/a 
JULION CEZAR RAMON-DURAN 
Case No. 20030310-CA 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the "pour-over" provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court commit plain error in rejecting a plea agreement 
which represented a significant reduction in the charge, and, thus, the 
defendant's potential sentence, where the prosecutor had not discussed 
the plea with the victim? 
Because defendant did not preserve this claim below, this Court should review 
them only for plain error. To establish plain error, defendant must show that (1) the trial 
court erred; (2) the error should have been obvious; and (3) the error was prejudicial. See 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following rules of criminal procedure are relevant to this appeal and 
reproduced at Addendum A: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 28; 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-37-3, 77-38-3, 77-38-4 (1999 & Supp. 2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 14, 2002, defendant was charged by amended information with one count 
of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(Supp. 2001) (R. 135-136). The information included notice of an enhanced penalty 
because the offense was committed in concert with two or more persons. Id. 
Before trial, the trial court rejected a plea agreement in which the prosecutor and 
defendant agreed to amend the information to charge a third degree felony (R. 200:4-7). 
After a three-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 165-166; R. 
203:31). Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than ten years in 
the Utah State Prison (R. 172-173). Defendant timely appealed (R. 181-182). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The crime. Sometime after 10:30 p.m. on January 26, 2002, defendant, who is 
also known as Delinquent, robbed Eric Contreras at gunpoint while a group of 
defendant's friends helped him (R. 202:16, 17, 34, 53-55, 94). 
That night, Contreras was with his friend, Edwin Rivas. R. 202:12, 49. While 
driving through the parking lot of the Excalibur dance club, Contreras saw another friend, 
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Sandra Palacios, who asked for a ride to Sandra Cortez's house (R. 202:12, 13-14, 27, 
51). 
Upon arriving at Cortez's house, Palacios and Contreras got out of the car and 
were talking (R. 202: 52). Then, a blue Ford Thunderbird pulled up behind Rivas's car, 
and five or six Latino males, including defendant, got out (R. 202: 26, 52-53). 
Palacios, who was defendant's girlfriend, approached the new arrivals (R. 202:52). 
Contreras got back into Rivas's car (R. 202:53). 
A short while later, one of the males from the Ford Thunderbird opened 
Contreras's door and told Contreras to get out (R. 202: 15, 53). Contreras complied (R. 
202:15, 53). Then, defendant and the rest of the males from the Thunderbird surrounded 
Contreras and moved him toward a tree near the front of the house (R. 202:15-16, 53). 
There, defendant drew a gun, pointed it at Contreras's head, and pushed him into the tree 
(R. 202:15-16). Defendant then put the gun to Contreras's head and took Contreras's 
rings, necklace, and wallet. (R. 202: 16-17). One of defendant's friends punched 
Contreras in the face, telling him not to squeal or they would "do something to [him]" (R. 
202: 16). 
Immediately after the robbery, Sandra Cortez came out of her house, told 
defendant and his friends to leave, and told Contreras to come inside (R. 202:16). 
Defendant and his friends left (R. 202:22). 
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Defendant was apprehended three months later during a traffic stop in which he 
gave the investigating officer a false name (R. 202:75-76). At the time, defendant was 
wearing Contreras's necklace and one of his rings (R. 202:16-20, 75-76). 
The Plea Discussion. At a pre-trial conference on December 13, 2002, the 
prosecutor and defense counsel presented the trial court with a plea agreement amending 
the information to a third degree felony in exchange for a guilty plea (R. 200: 3-4; 
Addendum B). 
Upon questioning from the court, the prosecutor indicated that "there are some 
facts that are—make the story not as presentable to the jury and I would rather accept 
the—the lesser plea than run the risk of (inaudible)" (R. 200:4). 
In response, the trial court noted that defendant had been originally charged with 
aggravated robbery and that the information indicated "that the defendant used a firearm, 
which would enhance that, and also that he committed a crime with four other persons, 
which would enhance that again" (R. 200:4). The court then indicated its practice not to 
waive fire enhancements "unless I'm convinced that there was some mistake in pleading" 
(R. 200:4). 
When defense counsel offered that "there's also the additional reason . . . in terms 
of judicial economy as well" (R. 200:4-5), the trial court responded: "I don't care about 
judicial economy when people are alleged to have used firearms in the commission of a 
crime" (R. 200:5). Thus, the court continued, "I'm not going to waive the firearms 
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enhancement [u]nless you can tell me you don't have any evidence that he didn't [sic] 
have a firearm or there wasn't [sic] a firearm or your witness is lying" (R. 200:5). 
At that point, the prosecutor explained that the evidence concerning the gun "is the 
story that is told by the—by the complaining witness" (R. 200:5). And, although those 
facts allege "a serious crime," "sometimes it's better to have the—the verdict in hand 
than—than two in the bush" (R. 200:5). The prosecutor continued, "I think this person is 
a dangerous person. My objective . . . and my duties to the taxpayers . . . is to take this 
person, who I believe to be a dangerous person, and lock him up" (R. 200:5-6). When the 
court responded, "Lock him up for zero to five, what kind of a deal is that?" the 
prosecutor noted, "It's better than zero to zero, your Honor" (R. 200:6). 
After confirming with the prosecutor that the prosecutor had discussed the plea 
with his supervisor, the court asked, "What does the victim say about this?" (R. 200:6). 
The prosecutor stated, "I have not talked to the victim about this particular one, although 
I've talked to the victim previously about offering a second (inaudible)" (R. 200:6). 
The court, after noting a supreme court case in which the court "accused the 
District Attorney's office and the trial judge of running rampant over victim's rights by 
not telling them what's going on," noted, "We haven't even told—we haven't even told 
the person who claims all these things occurred as to what are you going to do. I think 
he's entitled to know" (R. 200:6-7). 
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The court then concluded: "I'm not going to allow the filing of this amended 
information at this point and I'm not going to accept any plea to a third-degree felony on 
the basis of what I've heard" (R. 200:7). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his plea 
agreement. Specifically, defendant claims that the trial court's rejection of the plea was 
erroneous because the court " (0 failed to consider all legally relevant factors, 
(2) exceeded the limits prescribed by law, and (3) applied its discretion arbitrarily." 
This Court generally does not reach claims raised for the first time on appeal 
unless defendant can establish plain error. In addition, this Court will not consider a plain 
error claim if the record shows that defendant waived the error through invited error, i.e., 
if defendant either strategically chose to forego objecting below or led the trial court into 
the error he now claims. 
In this case, defendant not only did not raise his claims below when the trial court 
originally rejected the plea agreement but also strategically chose not to raise them on the 
morning of trial despite an invitation from the trial court to do so. Under such 
circumstances, this Court should reject defendant's claims as invited error. 
Moreover, each of defendant's challenges rest solely on his contention that "the 
trial court. . . summarily rejected the plea because it would not 'waive firearms 
enhancements.'" Nowhere does defendant address the other factors upon which the trial 
court based its decision, specifically the minimal sentence defendant would receive under 
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the plea agreement and the prosecutor's admission that he had not discussed the plea with 
the victim. Where the trial court's ruling rests on several grounds and defendant 
challenges only one, this Court need not reach his claim. Regardless of this Court's 
decision concerning the challenged ground, the other grounds remain to uphold the trial 
court's ruling. 
Finally, even if this Court reaches defendant's challenges, they fail because 
defendant cannot show plain error. A criminal defendant has no constitutional right to a 
plea agreement. Moreover, nothing in rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
requires a trial court to accept a plea agreement just because the prosecutor has agreed to 
it. Rather, a trial court has discretion to reject a plea agreement where that agreement 
appears contrary to the public interest or is otherwise objectionable. Moreover, a 
defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the rejection of a plea agreement unless 
he can show that he relied on the agreement in a way that prejudiced him at his 
subsequent trial. 
Here, the trial court considered the propriety of accepting a plea to third degree 
felony robbery with no enhancements after the defendant had been charged with first 
degree felony aggravated robbery because he used a gun, enhanced again because he 
committed the crime with two or more other persons. The trial court rejected the plea 
agreement because the prosecutor had proffered no evidence to suggest that the original 
aggravated robbery charge was unsustainable, because the sentence under the agreement 
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was not commensurate with defendant's conduct, and because the prosecutor had not 
discussed the agreement with the victim. 
Because the trial court's action was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, defendant 
cannot show error, let alone obvious error, in the court's ruling. Moreover, because 
defendant cannot show that he relied on the plea agreement to alter his position to his 
detriment at trial, defendant cannot show that he was harmed by the trial court's ruling, 
even if it were erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
REJECTING A PLEA AGREEMENT WHICH REPRESENTED A 
SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE CHARGE AND, THUS, 
DEFENDANT'S POTENTIAL SENTENCE, WHERE THE 
PROSECUTOR HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE PLEA WITH THE 
VICTIM 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his plea 
agreement with the State because "(A) it failed to consider all legally relevant factors, 
(B) it exceeded the scope of its authority, and (C) it applied its discretion arbitrarily." 
Aplt. Br. at 9. 
This Court should reject defendant's claims as invited error where defendant had 
strategic reasons not to revisit the court's plea ruling prior to trial despite having been 
invited to do so. Alternatively, this Court should reject defendant's claims because they 
are based on only one of the three grounds upon which the trial court based its ruling. 
Finally, this Court should reject defendant's claims because he fails to demonstrate plain 
error. 
A. This Court should reject defendant's challenges to the trial court's plea 
ruling where the court left open the possibility of revisiting its ruling 
before trial and, by strategically failing to take advantage of that 
possibility, defendant invited the errors of which he now complains. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that '"a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal.'" State v. Johnson, 
114 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^  11, 10 P.3d 346. The objection at trial 
must '"be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error . . . complained 
of,'" Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App. 1996) 
(quoting Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. v. Square D. Co., 699 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983)), 
so that the court '"might have an opportunity to correct [it] if [the court] deems it proper"' 
Id. (quoting Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah 
1974)) (second bracket in original). This preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . 
unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' 
occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f^ 11. 
In this case, the only claim defendant raised below was that the plea was desirable 
for reasons of judicial economy (R. 200:4-5). Because defendant did not raise any of his 
appellate claims below, this Court can consider them only for plain error. Holgate, 2000 
U T 7 4 4 11. 
However, even when a party claims plain error, "'if [the] party through counsel 
has made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court into 
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error, [this Court] will then decline to save that party from the error.'" See State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 
1989)). 
The reasons for this rule are two-fold. First, the rule "4fortifies our long-
established policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity to address the claim 
of error." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)). 
"' Second, it discourages parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as 
to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.'" Id. (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1220): 
If trial counsel were permitted to forego objecting . . . as part of a 
trial strategy that counsel thinks will enhance the defendant's 
chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, were permitted to 
claim on appeal that the Court should reverse because it was plain 
error for the court to [take such an action], [this Court] would be 
sanctioning a procedure that fosters invited error. 
Bullock, 791 P.2dat 159. 
Thus, the plain error doctrine "'is in no way implicated if defense counsel 
consciously elects to permit [a certain course of events] as part of a defense strategy 
rather than through inadvertence or neglect.'" Brown, 948 P.2d at 343 (quoting Bullock, 
791 P.2d at 159). Otherwise, "the trial judge is put in the untenable position of deciding 
whether to intervene and potentially interfere with trial counsel's strategy or face review 
for plain error." Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. 
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In this case, defense counsel and the prosecutor initially presented a plea 
agreement at the last pre-trial conference (R. 200:passim). The prosecutor explained that 
he favored the agreement because "there are some facts that are—make the story not as 
presentable to the jury and I would rather accept the—the lesser plea than run the risk of 
(inaudible)" (R. 200:4). Defense counsel's only comment was that the plea was also 
advantageous for reasons of "judicial economy" (R. 200:4-5). 
The trial court indicated that it was not the court's practice to waive firearm 
enhancements "unless I'm convinced that there was some mistake in pleading," i.e., 
"unless you can tell me you don't have any evidence that he [had] a firearm or there [was] 
a firearm or your witness is lying" (R. 200:5). The trial court also voiced its 
dissatisfaction with a plea that reduced the sentence of what the prosecutor admitted was 
a "dangerous man" to zero-to-five years (R. 200:6). Finally, after hearing that the 
prosecutor had not discussed the plea with the victim in this case, the trial court indicated, 
"I think he's entitled to know" (R. 200:6-7). 
The court then ruled: "I'm not going to allow the filing of this amended 
information at this point and I'm not going to accept any plea to a third-degree felony on 
the basis of what I've heard" (R. 200:7) (emphasis added). The clear implication of the 
trial court's ruling is that, while it was rejecting the plea agreement at that time, it would 
reconsider its ruling if either party cared to present additional argument at a later time. 
Nothing in the record suggests that defendant asked the trial court to revisit its plea 
ruling at a later time. Rather, the record indicates that defense counsel made a strategic 
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decision not to revisit the trial court's plea ruling before trial on any of the bases he now 
raises or on any other basis (R. 201). Instead, after hearing that the State's main 
witnesses—the victim Contreras and his friend Rivas—had left the court house on the 
morning of trial after being threatened (R. 201:4-5, 9), defense counsel took her chances 
and asked for an outright dismissal (R. 201:12-13). Then, when the trial court postponed 
ruling on her request to see if the witnesses appeared the next day (R. 201:13), counsel 
again yielded the opportunity to revisit the court's plea ruling—apparently taking her 
chances again, this time on a dismissal the next day if the witnesses again did not appear, 
or on an acquittal based on the weaknesses in the State's case referenced by the 
prosecutor during the plea discussions. 
Under such circumstances, this Court should reject defendant's plain error claims 
challenging the trial court's plea ruling as invited error. See Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159 ("If 
trial counsel were permitted to forego objecting . . . as part of a trial strategy that counsel 
thinks will enhance the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, 
were permitted to [raise the objection on appeal],. . . [this Court] would be sanctioning a 
procedure that fosters invited error."); see also Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109 (holding one 
reason for invited error rule is that "it discourages parties from intentionally misleading 
the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.") (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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B. This Court should reject defendant's challenges to the trial court's plea 
ruling where they focus on only one of the grounds upon which the trial 
court relied below. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's plea ruling as an abuse of discretion, 
claiming the trial court "applied a blanket refusal to consider the plea because [defendant] 
was charged with using a firearm" and, thus, "selected] one specific fact at the expense 
of all other relevant facts to mechanically reject [defendant's] plea." Aplt. Br. at 22; see 
also Aplt. Br. at 11, 16. Because defendant challenges the trial court's ruling on only one 
of the grounds relied upon below, this Court need not address defendant's claims. 
In State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 802 (Utah App. 1998), the defendant was 
convicted of rape of a child and sodomy of a child. On appeal, the defendant claimed that 
the trial court had abused its discretion in sentencing him to maximum minimum 
mandatory sentences on each of his two convictions. See id. at 810. In addressing the 
defendant's claim, this Court noted that "defendant challenges only two of the four 
aggravating circumstances upon which the trial court based its sentencing determination." 
Id. This Court then held that, "because defendant does not challenge the trial court's 
findings [on the other two circumstances], we need not address whether the trial court 
erred in considering the two disputed bases." Id.; see also State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 
1301 (Utah 1993) (holding that trial court's reliance on improper aggravating factor is 
harmless where additional aggravating factors supported sentence); State v. Russell, 791 
P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) (same); State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988) (same). 
Cf. State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, K 10, 994 P.2d 1237 (rejecting defendant's claim that 
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evidence was inadmissible under a statutory provision where evidence was admissible on 
another basis); Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 256 (Utah 1998) (holding habeas court erred 
in reversing convictions based on error in admitting child victim's hearsay statements 
under statute where statements were admissible under rules of evidence). 
At least one court has applied the same rationale in reviewing a trial court's 
rejection of a plea agreement. State v. Southworth, 52 P.3d 987, 997 (N.M. App. 2002) 
(holding "we need not determine whether a trial court would abuse its discretion if it 
rejected a plea merely because the plea was entered after the expiration of a court-
imposed deadline" where "the record shows that the court rejected the plea for a number 
of reasons"), cert denied, 52 P.3d 411 (N.M. 2002). 
In this case, defendant challenges the trial court's plea ruling as an abuse of 
discretion, claiming that the court "refused to . . . consider a plea agreement at all because 
it would not 'waive firearms enhancements.'" Aplt. Br. at 16; see also Aplt. Br. at 11, 22. 
Nowhere does defendant acknowledge, let alone show error in, the trial court's 
alternative grounds for rejecting the plea agreement—that the minimal sentence was not 
commensurate to the charged crime or defendant's dangerousness and that prosecutor had 
not informed the victim of the plea agreement. Cf. State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, 
U 15, 17 P.3d 1153 (indicating that trial court could properly reject plea agreement that 
"failed to adequately address the issue of restitution"); State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 
578 (Tenn. 1995) (noting "a valid reason for rejecting a plea agreement is that the 
proposed sentence is considered too lenient under the circumstances"); Southworth, 52 
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P.3d at 997 (same); United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 2002) (same); 
United States v. Torres -Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 696 (2nd Cir. 1997) (same); United 
States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1439 (10,h Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. 
Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985) (same, even where prosecutor voiced 
concern over difficulty of proving charged crimes and parties raised issue of judicial 
economy); United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); United 
States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1977) (same); see also People v. Grove, 566 
N.W.2d 547, 588 (Mich. 1997) (holding trial court properly considered interests of victim 
in rejecting plea); cf. State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29,1fi[ 26, 37 & n.l 1, 44 P.3d 756 (holding 
victim's "constitutional and statutory right to be heard upon request... include[s] the 
right to be heard upon request at defendant's change of plea hearing"; noting that, 
although not required before accepting or rejecting a plea agreement, informing a victim 
of the agreement is "sound judicial practice"); Utah Const, art. I, § 28; Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 77-37-3, 77-38-3, 77-38-4 (1999 & Supp.2003). 
Under such circumstances, this Court "need not address whether the trial court 
erred in considering the . . . disputed bas[is]." Baker, 963 P.2d at 810; see also Strunk, 
846 P.2d at 1301; Russell, 791 P.2d at 192; Lovell, 758 P.2d at 913; Southworth, 52 P.3d 
at 99; cf. Loose, 2000 UT 11, U 11; Julian, 966 P.2d at 256. 
15 
C. This Court should reject defendant's challenges to the trial court's plea 
ruling where he cannot show the court committed plain error in 
rejecting an agreement which represented a significant reduction in the 
charge and, thus, defendant's potential sentence, and the prosecutor 
had not discussed the plea with the victim. 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in rejecting defendant's 
plea "by failing to consider all legally relevant factors, exceeding the scope of its 
authority and applying its discretion arbitrarily when it rejected [defendant's] plea 
agreement." Aplt. Br. at 8-9, 26. Defendant claims the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court because its decision to reject the plea agreement was "based not on the 
proper exercise of its judicial discretion but on the arbitrary exercise of its personal bias 
toward defendants who are charged with using a firearm." Aplt. Br. at 26; see also Aplt. 
Br. at 11, 16, 22. Finally, defendant claims he was prejudiced by the trial court's decision 
because, "[i]f the trial court had considered the legally relevant factors of Montiel's case 
and deferred to the State's prosecutorial discretion, rather than summarily rejecting the 
plea because Montiel was charged with using a firearm, there is a substantial likelihood 
that the trial court would have accepted the plea agreement." Aplt. Br. at 26-27; see also 
Aplt. Br. at 24. 
Because defendant did not raise his claims below, they succeed only if defendant 
can show plain error. To establish plain error, defendant must show that (1) the trial court 
erred; (2) the error should have been obvious; and (3) the error was prejudicial. See State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
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Moreover, where defendant presents a plain error challenge to a trial court's ruling 
generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion defendant must show 
"must be much more blatant than the garden variety 'abuse of discretion' featured in 
routine appellate review." State v. Stirba, 872 P.2d 918, 923 (Utah App. 1998 (discussing 
standard of review where State challenged ruling for abuse of discretion under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B) (citation omitted)). Under such circumstances, defendant must show a 
"'gross and flagrant' abuse of discretion." Id. (quoting Renn v. Utah State Bd. of 
Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995)). 
Finally, "[t]o show obviousness of the error, [defendant] must show that the law 
was clear at the time of trial." State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, K 6, 18 P.3d 1123; see 
also State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, f 22, 53 P.3d 486, cert, denied, 63 P.3d 104 
(Utah 2002); State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997). 
Here, defendant cannot show error, let alone obvious and prejudicial error. 
1. General law regarding plea agreements. 
"Plea bargaining is an essential component of the criminal justice system." State v. 
Pearson, 818 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1991) (discussing admission of evidence of plea 
negotiations). Not only does such bargaining "lead[] to the prompt and . . . final 
disposition of most criminal cases," Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971), 
but it may also "affordf] the prosecutor additional leverage in prosecuting other crimes, 
and allows defendants who acknowledge guilt to spare themselves and the public an 
expensive trial," State v. Eager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Iowa 2001). Consequently, 
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'"[pjroperly administered, [plea bargaining] is to be encouraged.'" Pearson, 818 P.2d at 
582 (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260) (second alternation in original) (emphasis 
added). 
However, "[a] criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the 
Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 
U.S. 25, 38 n.l 1 (1970); see also Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; Lynch v. Overholser, 369 
U.S. 705, 719 (1962). Indeed, "[a] plea bargain, standing alone, is without constitutional 
significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the 
judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally 
protected interest." Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984); see also State v. 
Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, K 14, 17 P.3d 1153. 
Moreover, a criminal defendant has no right to a plea bargain under Utah law. 
Rather, "[t]he Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly provide that '[t]he court may 
refuse to accept a plea of guilty.'" State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah App. 
1995) (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 11); see also State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah App. 
1989) ("Nothing in [rule 11] requires a court to accept a guilty plea."). "[E]ven where 
'the government and the defendant reach a plea agreement, the court is not required to 
accept it.'" State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, K 14, 17 P.3d 1153 (citation omitted); 
Consequently, even though "disposition of criminal charges by agreement between 
the prosecutor and the accused . . . is an essential component of the administration of 
justice," "[a] court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion." Santobello, 
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404 U.S. at 260, 262; see also Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, % 14; Turner, 980 P.2d at 
1190; United States v. Torres -Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 695 (2nd Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 45 (2nd Cir. 1986). 
2. Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred, let alone 
obviously erred, in failing to consider "all relevant factors" before 
rejecting the plea agreement. 
Defendant claims that "[a] trial court has a duty, before rejecting a plea agreement, 
to 'consider all legally relevant factors.'" Aplt. Br. at 9-14 (quoting Turner, 980 P.2d at 
1190). Defendant claims first that the trial court did not do this because it "fail[ed] to 
evaluate the circumstances of Montiel's case." Aplt Br. at 9 (holding and capitalization 
omitted). He claims second that the trial court did not do this because it rejected the plea 
agreement "without determining the propriety of the particular bargain proposed." Aplt. 
Br. at 12. 
In support of his contentions, defendant cites two Utah cases addressing plea 
agreements and one Utah rule of procedure. See Aplt. Br. at 8-26 (citing State v. Turner, 
980 P.2d 1188 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah App. 1989); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11). None of this authority supports his contentions. 
In Mane, the defendant was charged with murder in the first degree, attempted 
murder, and two counts of aggravated assault. Mane, 783 P.2d at 62. After the State's 
case-in-chief, Mane "offered to plead guilty to [one] aggravated assault charge." Id. at 
66. The trial court rejected Mane's plea, "stating the defendant could plead guilty only 
after he presented his defense to the jury but prior to the verdict." Id. When Mane 
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renewed his motion at the close of his case-in-chief, the trial court rejected the plea 
"because defendant had just testified that he had no memory of any of his actions." Id. 
When Mane "then offered to plead guilty to the attempted homicide charge," the trial 
court rejected that plea for the same reason. Id. 
In affirming the trial court's rulings, this Court's entire analysis consisted of the 
following paragraph: 
Defendant incorrectly insists the court was obligated to accept 
his guilty plea. Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides that "[t]he court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no 
contest." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(e) (Supp. 1988) (repeated 
effective July 1, 1990). Nothing in the statute requires a court to 
accept a guilty plea and defendant has cited no case authority for that 
proposition. We conclude, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by refusing to accept defendant's guilty plea. 
Id. 
In Turner, the defendant was charged with negligent homicide and driving left of 
center after his truck crossed over the center dividing line into oncoming traffic and hit a 
motorcycle, causing the motorcyclist's death. Turner, 980 P.2d at 1189. At the 
arraignment, defendant pleaded guilty to the driving left of center charge and not guilty to 
the negligent homicide charge, and then requested immediate sentencing on his plea. Id. 
The State, concerned that Turner "was trying to create a 'double jeopardy' problem which 
would prohibit the State from prosecuting [him] on the negligent homicide charge," asked 
the court to reject Turner's guilty plea or "reserve its ruling . . . until after trial on both 
charges." Id. After the trial court expressed "reservations about its decision to accept the 
plea,. . . defense counsel persuaded the court that it was obliged to accept the plea, and 
20 
the court acceded." Id. A different court then granted Turner's motion to dismiss the 
negligent homicide charge. Id. 
On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court's acceptance of Turner's guilty plea. 
Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190. In doing so, this Court reiterated: 
Contrary to defendant's assertion below, that the trial court was 
obligated to accept his guilty plea, defendant had no absolute right to 
have his plea of guilt accepted. See Lynch v. Overhoteer, 369 U.S. 
705, 719, 82 S. Ct. 1063, 1072, 8 L.Ed.2d211 (1962). The Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly provide that "[t]he trial court 
may refuse to accept a plea of guilty." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e); see 
also Lynch, 369 U.S. at 719, 82 S. Ct. at 1072 (stating under Rule 11 
of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure "trial judge may refuse to 
accept [guilty] plea and enter a plea of not guilty on behalf of the 
accused"). In addition, this court has previously held that "[n]othing 
in [Rule 11(e) requires a court to accept a guilty plea." Mane, 783 
P.2d at 66. 
Id. 
The Court continued: "Because it is unclear whether the trial court erroneously 
assumed it was obliged to accept the plea rather than realizing it had the discretion to 
accept or reject the plea, we must determine whether the trial court's acceptance of 
defendant's plea was an abuse of that discretion." Id. 
Then, with no analysis as to which was appropriate for determining abuse of 
discretion in the specific area of plea bargains, this Court set forth the traditional tests 
used to determine abuse of discretion, noting that discretion is abused "if the actions of 
the judge are inherently unfair," "if its decision is beyond the limits of reasonableness," or 
if "the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors." Id. (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Without further explanation, this Court applied only the first and second tests in 
concluding that "under the circumstances of this case, acceptance of the plea over the 
timely and specific objections of the State was unfair and unreasonable, effectively 
nullifying the State's right to prosecute defendant on the charge of negligent homicide." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Neither Mane nor Turner support defendant's claim that the trial court committed 
error, let alone obvious error, in rejecting defendant's plea agreement here. Mane upheld 
the trial court's initial rejection of the defendant's plea even though the lower court 
apparently gave no reasons for its decision, and then upheld the court's subsequent 
rejection of his plea on the sole basis that the defendant had feigned no memory of his 
criminal conduct. See Mane, 783 P.2d at 66. Turner did not even involve review of the 
rejection of a plea, and merely identified the prosecutor's interest in prosecuting on a 
greater crime and society's "'interest in the vindication of criminal justice" as relevant 
factors in determining whether to accept a plea. See Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190 (citation 
omitted). Thus, neither case provides significant guidance to trial courts as to what 
factors, if any, it must consider before rejecting a plea. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, similarly provides little guidance 
concerning the trial court's discretion to reject pleas. Although defendant cites to Rule 
11(e) as identifying some of the factors a trial court must consider before rejecting a plea, 
see Aplt. Br. at 10, 13, Rule 11(e) in fact identifies no such factors. Rather, rule 11(e) 
merely identifies those findings a trial court must make before it may accept a plea. See 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) ("The court.. . may not accept the plea until the court has found 
. . . .")• Otherwise, the rule merely provides that "[t]he court may refuse to accept a plea 
of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill." Id. 
Because neither Mane, Turner, nor Rule 11(e) identify any mandatory factors a 
trial court must consider before rejecting a plea, none of them support defendant's plain 
error claim that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering all legally relevant 
factors before rejecting his plea. See State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ^ 15, 17 P.3d 
1153 (suggesting that a trial court may properly reject plea agreement that "failed to 
adequately address the issue of restitution"); see also Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, f 22; 
Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, % 6; Ross, 951 P.2d at 239. 
As a consequence, defendant relies primarily on selected case law from foreign 
jurisdictions—none of which are controlling in Utah—to identify such factors. See Aplt. 
Br. at 8 n.2 (explaining that "[t]he limits of a trial court's discretion to reject guilty pleas 
are not yet clearly defined by Utah case law," and thus that defendant's brief "relies 
largely on case law from other jurisdictions); see also Aplt. Br. At 9-13 (citing cases). 
However, defendant cannot demonstrate complete uniformity amongst those cases. 
See, e.g., Hockada v. United States, 359 A.2d 146, 148 & n.4 (D.C. App. 1976) (holding 
only that trial court's ruling must show that "its action was the result of an informed and 
reasoned exercise of discretion" and "where, as here, a disposition has been agreed upon 
by both the defendant and the government, the trial court must identify good reasons for a 
departure from following that course"); Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160, 165 (Ind. 1983) 
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(not providing list of mandatory factors court must consider, but merely noting that trial 
court considered evidence of crime, defendant's presentence report, feelings of victim's 
family, time spent by parties in arranging plea, and respect due criminal statutes); Stacks 
v. State, 111 RE.2d 1201, 1207 (Ind. App. 1978) (holding trial court "'bears an 
obligation to evaluate the circumstances of the case and determine the propriety of the 
particular bargain,'" but failing to provide any further guidance to trial courts concerning 
factors it should consider); State v. Eager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 836 (Iowa 2001) (holding 
that trial court may not reject plea solely because of missed deadline; requiring trial court 
to provide additional reasons but noting u[t]hese additional reasons are broad and fall 
within the ambit of the court's power over the administration of justice" and "may relate 
to the terms of the plea agreement [or] the proper disposition of the case"); State v. 
Clanton, 612 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Kan. App. 1980) (not providing list of mandatory factors 
court must consider, but merely holding that decision to accept or reject plea after 
statutory requirements met is within sound judicial discretion of court and "will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless it is determined that no reasonable person could take the view 
adopted by the trial judge" ); Sparks v. State, 759 P.2d 180, 184-85 (Nev. 1988) (per 
curiam) (holding trial court must "consider seriously the proffered plea" but providing 
only the most general outline of factors court can consider in rejecting plea); State v. 
Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 577-78 (Tenn. 1995) (not providing list of mandatory factors 
court must consider, but merely noting what trial court considered, including victim's 
position and leniency of sentence under plea); State v. Reuschel, 312 A.2d 739, 743 (Vt. 
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1973) (not providing list of mandatory factors court must consider, but merely noting that 
trial court considered, including defendant's vacillating statements regarding his guilt and 
evidence State would produce); State v. Sears, 542 S.E.2d 863, 867 (W.Va. 2000) (setting 
forth specific factors court should consider before rejecting plea, including whether plea 
was voluntary, whether plea had factual basis, the "general public's perception that 
crimes should be prosecuted," the "interests of victims," the "entire criminal event," 
"defendant's prior criminal record," and whether the plea bargain allows the court "to 
dispose of the case in a manner commensurate with the seriousness of the criminal 
charges and the character and background of the defendant"). 
Moreover, defendant cannot demonstrate that any list of factors identified in those 
cases actually enjoys universal acceptance. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 
129 F.3d 692, 696 (2nd. Cir. 1997) (holding only that "[ajmong the reasons that may 
justify the exercise of discretion to reject a plea agreement is a concern that the resulting 
sentence would be too lenient"); United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 563, 566 (9th Cir. 
1993) (holding only that, although trial court may reject bargain as "too lenient, or 
otherwise not in the public interest," court's decision must also show that it considered 
prosecutor's reasons for presenting plea offer); United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 
45-46 (2nd Cir. 1986) (noting "Rule 11 does not purport to establish criteria for the 
acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement" and holding only that "if the court has 
reasonable grounds for beliving that acceptance of the plea would be contrary to the 
sound administration of justice, it may reject the plea"); United States v. Carrigan, 778 
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F.2d 1454, 1461-62 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting "plea agreement procedure does not attempt 
to define criteria for the acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement" and that plea may be 
rejected if "the district court believes that the bargain is too lenient or otherwise not in the 
public interest") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Moore, 
637 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (holding "Rule 11 does not require 
district courts to either accept a guilty plea or delineate its reasons for rejecting it"); State 
v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 702 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that, where Rule 11 provides 
"specific procedural requirements for entering gulty pleas, we find that the absence of any 
requirement that the court state its reasons for refusing a plea bargain indicates that no 
statement of reasons is necessary"); State v. Jasper, 17 P.3d 807, 814-16 (Colo. 2001) (en 
banc) (affirming trial court's rejection of plea agreement, without considering merits, 
based solely on fact that plea was presented after deadline where parties presented no 
good cause for missing deadline); People v. Grove, 566 N.W.2d 547, 558 (Mich. 1997) 
(affirming trial court's rejection of plea where trial court considered facts of crime, 
interest of victim, and hindrance on court's ability to impose appropriate sentence). 
Here, the trial court considered each of the following factors before rejecting the 
proposed plea agreement: 
(1) the prosecutor's concerns regarding the strength of his 
evidence as a factor in favor of accepting the plea (R. 200:4, 
5); 
(2) the prosecutor's failure to persuade the court that "there was 
some mistake in pleading" aggravated robbery (robbery 
enhanced to a first degree felony because defendant used a 
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firearm), where trial court generally does not waive firearm 
enhancements (R. 200:4, 5); 
(3) defense counsel's reference to judicial economy as a factor in 
favor of accepting the plea (R. 200:4-5); 
(4) the seriousness of defendant's crime (R. 200:5); 
(5) the lack of congruity between the prosecutor's claim that 
defendant "is a dangerous person" should be "lock[ed] up" 
and the prosecutor's willingness to have defendant plead to a 
crime that exposed defendant to a maximum sentence of zero-
to-five years (R. 200:5-6); and 
(6) the fact that the agreement reduced a first degree felony 
(robbery enhanced to aggravated robbery because defendant 
used a firearm) to a third degree felony (R. 200:4); and 
(7) the prosecutor's admission that he had not discussed this 
particular plea with the victim, even though the court felt the 
victim had a right to know (R. 200:6-7). 
Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court "did . . . consider . . . evidence 
of the charged crime." Aplt. Br. at 11. Also contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court 
did "consider the victim's actual desires." Aplt. Br. at 11. And, contrary to defendant's 
claim, the trial court did consider "whether the plea was appropriate in light of the entire 
charged crime" and "whether the State's reasons for entering the plea agreement were 
appropriate in light of public interest." Aplt. Br. at 13. 
In light of this myriad of cases cited above, defendant cannot show that the trial 
court erred, let alone obviously erred, in failing to consider additional factors before 
rejecting the plea agreement in this case. Cf. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ^ 15 
(suggesting trial court could properly reject plea agreement that "failed to adequately 
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address the issue of restitution"); Hines, 919 S.W.2d at 578 (holding "a valid reason for 
rejecting a plea agreement is that the proposed sentence is considered too lenient under 
the circumstances"); see also State v. Southworth, 52 P.3d 987, 997 (N.M. App. 2002) 
(same), cert, denied, 52 P.3d 411 (N.M. 2002); United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447 
(5th Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1439 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(same); Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 696 (same); Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462 (same, 
even where prosecutor voiced concern over difficulty of proving charged crimes and 
parties raised issue of judicial economy); Miller, 111 F.2d at 563 (same); Bean, 564 F.2d 
at 704 (same); and see also Southworth, 52 P.3d at 996 (affirming rejection of plea even 
though "State's offer was made in light of evidence obtained . . . suggesting credibility 
problems on both sides"); and see also Grove, 566 N.W.2d at 588 (holding trial court 
properly considered interests of victim in rejecting plea); cf. State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, 
ffl[ 26, 37 & n.l 1, 44 P.3d 756 (holding victim's "constitutional and statutory right to be 
heard upon request at important criminal justice hearings include[s] the right to be heard 
upon request at defendant's change of plea hearing"; noting that, although required before 
accepting or rejecting a plea agreement, informing a victim of the agreement is "sound 
judicial practice"); Utah Const, art. I, § 28; Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-37-3, 77-38-3, 77-38-4 
(1999&Supp.2003). 
Consequently, defendant's plain error claim fails. 
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3. Defendant's claim that the trial court committed plain error by 
exceeding the scope of its authority in rejecting the plea 
agreement fails where he presents no controlling law on the 
issue. 
Alternatively, defendant claims that the trial court "abused its discretion [in 
rejecting the plea agreement] by exceeding the scope of its authority." Aplt. Br. at 14 
(holding and capitalization omitted). Specifically, defendant claims that the trial court 
"exceeded the scope of its authority by usurping the State's right to prosecute" and thus 
"infringing on the separation of powers." Aplt. Br. at 14-15 (holding and capitalization 
omitted). Defendant has not established plain error. 
As with his previous claim, defendant cites to very little controlling Utah law to 
support his claim. See Aplt. Br. at 14-21 (citing only to State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 
1190 (Utah App. 1995), and Utah Const. Art. V, § 1 (the separation of powers 
provision)).1 
Although Turner recognized that a trial court should consider the prosecutor's 
interest in prosecuting a defendant on the original charges filed when it considers a plea 
to a lesser offense over the prosecutor's objection, see Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190, Turner 
never expressly addressed the separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution or 
'Article V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be 
divided into three distinct departments, the Legislature, the 
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to 
either of the others. 
Utah Const. Art. V., § 1. 
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the extent to which that provision limits a trial court's discretion to reject plea bargains 
favored by the prosecutor. 
Thus, neither defendant's citation to Turner nor his citation without analysis to the 
separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution establish that the trial court 
committed plain error in rejecting the plea agreement here. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (holding defendant must establish obvious and prejudicial 
error to succeed on plain error claim); see also State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^  6, 18 
P.3d 1123 ("To show obviousness of the error, [defendant] must show that the law was 
clear at the time of trial."); State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, \ 22, 53 P.3d 486, cert 
denied, 63 P.3d 104 (Utah 2002); State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997). 
Neither does the case law from foreign jurisdictions cited by defendant. 
As a general rule, "[t]he decision to indict, allege specific charges, or dismiss 
charges is inherently an exercise of executive power, and the prosecutor has broad 
discretion in these matters." United States v. Martin, 287 F.3d 609, 623 (7th Cir. 2002); 
see also United States v. Arenas-Ortiz, 339 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003); United States 
v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001). To that 
extent, the cases cited by the State are consistent with the cases cited by defendant. See 
Aplt. Br. at 14-15 (citing cases explaining why prosecutors are in better position than 
courts to determine what charges to file). 
However, the cases cited by defendant and the State diverge sharply on the roles of 
prosecutor and judge once initial charges have been filed. Defendant's cases suggest that, 
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even after initial charges are filed, the prosecutor's "decision to enter a plea agreement 'is 
to be followed in the overwhelming number of cases,'" and that, especially in plea cases 
involving changes to the original charges, "the trial court 'does not have primary 
responsibility [of determining the appropriate plea], but rather the [secondary] role of 
guarding against abuses of prosecutorial discretion.'" Aplt. Br. at 15, 17 (quoting United 
States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and Hockaday v. United States, 
359 A.2d 146, 148 (D.C. App. 1976); citing Sandy v. Fifth Judicial District Court, 935 
P.2dll48, 1151 (Nev. 1997)). 
Numerous jurisdictions reject that view. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, for 
example, has expressly rejecting the approach adopted in Ammidown, "find[ing] 
unacceptable the District of Columbia standard that a court must accept a plea unless the 
bargain is 'such a departure from sound prosecutorial principle as to mark an abuse of 
prosecutorial discretion'" and noting that "[t]o our knowledge no other circuit has 
followed the District of Columbia in so drastically limiting the discretion of a judge in 
regard to plea bargains." United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 703 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977); see 
also United States v. Moore, 637 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ('The 
precedential value of Ammidown has been considerably diminished since the adoption of 
the 1974 amendments to Rule 11 that were intended to increase the discretionary 
authority of the district court in dealing with guilty pleas."); State v. Daniels, 648 A.2d 
266, 268 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (rejecting idea in Ammidown that plea agreement 
can only be rejected if it "'constitutes an abuse of prosecutorial discretion'"; noting 
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Ammidown has been superseded by amendment to Rule 11 "and by subsequent federal 
cases which enhance the discretionary authority of the district courts in dealing with 
guilty pleas.") (citation omitted).2 
Under these cases, once the prosecutor decides what charges to file, "the court has 
a role to play in plea bargains." Martin, 287 F.3d at 623. Thus, once charges are filed, 
"[t]he [government's authority in choosing what offenses a defendant will face is 
tempered by the role of the district court in accepting or rejecting plea agreements." 
United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 2002). 
Under these cases, the same separation of powers concerns raised at the charging 
stage are not so prevalent at the plea stage. See Bean, 564 F.2d at 703 n.4 ("Although a 
prosecutor may have wide discretion in initiating prosecutions, once the aid of the court 
has been invoked the court cannot be expected to accept without question the prosecutor's 
view of the public good."); cf. United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1465 (10th Cir. 
1985) (holding order denying plea bargain under Rule 1 he) "does not present the same 
constitutional difficulties as one denying" the State's motion to totally dismiss charges). 
In fact, "[p]lea bargains . . . go to the traditionally judicial function of determining 
what penalty to impose." United States v. Escobar Noble, 653 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 1981). 
Therefore, especially "where the plea agreement involves essentially the dismissal of the 
Although Sandy v. Fifth Judicial District Court, 935 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Nev. 
1997), a case cited by defendant, does not expressly rely on Ammidown, Sandy relies on 
Sparks v. State, 759 P.2d 180 (Nev. 1988) (per curiam), which does expressly rely on 
Ammidown. See Sparks, 759 P.2d at 184-85. Thus, the Nevada cases are subject to the 
same criticism directed at Ammidown. 
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sole count in the original charge and a plea of guilty to a lesser offense," such agreement 
"implicates core judicial functions,"—and thus separation of powers concerns of 
prosecutorial infringement—and the "court's adjudicatory and sentencing responsibilities 
justify active scrutiny of the plea agreement." United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 129 
F.3d 692, 697 (2nd Cir. 1997); see also Miller, 111 F.2d at 563 (noting that discretion to 
reject pleas "protects against erosion of the judicial sentencing power"). 
Consequently, while some courts have stated that trial courts should "hesita[te] 
before second-guessing prosecutorial choices" concerning a plea bargain, United States v. 
Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1438 (10th Cir. 1995) (a case cited by defendant); see also 
Miller, 111 F.2d at 565, and consider the prosecutor's reasons for presenting the bargain, 
see Escobar Noble, 653 F.2d at 36, the trial court violates no separation of powers 
principles in exercising its discretion to reject the bargain if the court believes the 
defendant would receive too light a sentence under it. See Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1439; 
Miller, 111 F.2d at 563; see also United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(rejecting defendant's claim that the trial court "abused its discretion when it rejected the 
initial plea agreement by usurping the Government's exclusive authority to determine 
when a prosecution should be terminated"); Martin, 287 F.3d at 624. Cf. Escobar Noble, 
653F.2dat37. 
In this case, the plea bargain involved the reduction of a original first degree 
felony charge (with an enhancement) to a third degree felony charge (R. 200:passim). 
Thus, the agreement went "to the traditionally judicial function of determining what 
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penalty to impose," Escobar Noble, 653 F.2d at 37, and "implicate[d] core judicial 
functions," Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 697. 
Under such circumstances, the "court's adjudicatory and sentencing 
responsibilities justified] active scrutiny of the plea agreement," Torres-Echavarria, 129 
F.3d at 697, and rejection of that agreement if the court concluded "the bargain [was] too 
lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest.'" Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462 (quoting 
Miller, 722 F.2d at 563). Based on this case law, defendant has not shown that the trial 
court committed plain error in violation of the separation of powers provision of the Utah 
constitution in rejecting the plea on those bases. 
4. Defendant's claim that the trial court committed plain error by 
arbitrarily rejecting the plea agreement fails where the record 
does not support it 
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court "abused its discretion by arbitrarily 
rejecting Montiel's plea agreement" by "applying] a blanket refusal to consider the plea 
because Montiel was charged with using a firearm." Aplt. Br. at 22. Defendant claims 
that, "[b]y selecting one specific fact at the expense of all other relevant facts to 
mechanically reject Montiel's plea, the trial court acted arbitrarily and abused its 
discretion." Apl1. Br. at 22-23. This Court should reject defendant's claim as 
unsupported by the record. 
As previously noted, the trial court considered all of the following factors before 
rejecting the plea agreement: 
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(1) the prosecutor's concerns regarding the strength of his 
evidence as a factor in favor of accepting the plea (R. 200:4, 
5); 
(2) the prosecutor's failure to persuade the court that "there was 
some mistake in pleading" aggravated robbery (robbery 
enhanced to a first degree felony because defendant used a 
firearm), where trial court generally does not waive firearm 
enhancements (R. 200:4, 5); 
(3) defense counsel's reference to judicial economy as a factor in 
favor of accepting the plea (R. 200:4-5); 
(4) the seriousness of defendant's crime (R. 200:5); 
(5) the lack of congruity between the prosecutor's claim that 
defendant "is a dangerous person" should be "lockfed] up" 
and the prosecutor's willingness to have defendant plead to a 
crime that exposed defendant to a maximum sentence of zero-
to-five years (R. 200:5-6); and 
(6) the fact that the agreement reduced a first degree felony 
(robbery enhanced to aggravated robbery because defendant 
used a firearm) to a third degree felony (R. 200:4); and 
(7) the prosecutor's admission that he had not discussed this 
particular plea with the victim, even though the court felt the 
victim had a right to know (R. 200:6-7). 
Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court did not "arbitrarily" reject the 
plea agreement "based solely on its personal policy to never waive firearms 
enhancements." Aplt. Br. at 23.3 
3In fact, the court's policy was not to "never waive firearms enhancements," Aplt. 
Br. at 23, but, rather, to waive them only if the prosecutor proffered that the enhancement 
was improperly charged or that the evidence was insufficient to support it (R. 200:5). 
Such a policy is not obviously erroneous. See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160, 165 
(Ind. 1983) (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in rejecting plea to original charge 
that removed consideration of death penalty despite victim's support for plea and "great 
deal of time" spent in arranging plea, where trial court "was concerned with affording the 
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5. Defendant's plain error claims fail because he cannot show he 
was prejudiced by the court's rejection of the plea agreement. 
Defendant claims that he was prejudiced by the trial court's rejection of his plea 
"because, 4[b]y proceeding to trial,' the defendant [was] 'exposed to a greater possible 
punishment than that which could have resulted from his guilty pleas." Aplt. Br. at 24 
(quoting Hockaday v. United States, 359 A.2d 146, 149 (D.C. App. 1976)). Alternatively, 
defendant claims he was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling because, "[i]f the trial court 
had considered the legally relevant factors of Montiel's case and deferred to the State's 
prosecutorial discretion, rather than summarily rejecting the plea because Montiel was 
charged with using a firearm, there is a substantial likelihood that the trial court would 
have accepted the plea agreement." Aplt. Br. at 26-27. Defendant's claim fails because 
he has used the wrong standard to measure prejudice under these circumstances. 
In the context of a rejected plea agreement, a defendant is prejudiced by a trial 
court's abuse of discretion only if he can show that he "took any action in reliance on the 
tentative agreement" that "would substantially affect" his trial. State v. Stringham, 2001 
UT App 13, ^ 15-16, 17 P.3d 1153 (indicating that trial court could properly reject plea 
agreement that "failed to adequately address the issue of restitution."). 
In this case, defendant does not claim that he took any action in reliance on his 
tentative plea agreement with the prosecutor, let alone that such action substantially 
proper credibility and respect to the death penalty statute as a law which had been passed 




affected his trial. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in rejecting the 
plea agreement, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's error. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's conviction 
and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 2 j _ November 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
37 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on 2,g November 2003,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, or caused to be delivered two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to 
Lori J. Seppi and Heidi A. Buchi, attorneys for defendant, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
f^AJiM Q. phoi^i 
38 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English 
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to 
the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence 
is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and 
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; Novem-




Sec. 28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
(1) To preserve and protect victims* rights to justice and due process, victims 
of crimes have these rights, as defined by law: 
(a) To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from 
harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice process; 
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and to be heard at 
important criminal justice hearings related to the victim, either in person 
or through a lawful representative, once a criminal information or 
indictment charging a crime has been publicly filed in court; and 
(c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purpose of imposing an appro-
priate sentence, receive and consider, without evidentiary limitation, 
reliable information concerning the background, character, and conduct of 
a person convicted of an offense except that this subsection does not apply 
to capital cases or situations involving privileges. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a cause of action 
for money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or for dismissing any criminal 
charge, or relief from any criminal judgment. 
(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony crimes and such 
other crimes or acts, including juvenile offenses, as the Legislature may 
provide. 




77-37-3. Bill of Rights. 
(1) The bill of rights for victims and witnesses is: 
(a) Victims and witnesses have a right to be informed as to the level of 
protection from intimidation and harm available to them, and from what 
sources, as they participate in criminal justice proceedings as designated 
by Section 76-8-508, regarding witness tampering, and Section 76-8-509, 
regarding threats against a victim. Law enforcement, prosecution, and 
corrections personnel have the duty to timely provide this information in 
a form that is useful to the victim. 
lb) Victims and witnesses, including children and their guardians, have 
a right to be informed and assisted as to their role in the criminal justice 
process. All criminal justice agencies have the duty to provide this 
information and assistance. 
(c) Victims and witnesses have a right to clear explanations regarding 
relevant legal proceedings; these explanations shall be appropriate to the 
age of child victims and witnesses. All criminal justice agencies have the 
duty to provide these explanations. 
(d) Victims and witnesses should have a secure waiting area that does 
not require them to be in close proximity to defendants or the family and 
friends of defendants. Agencies controlling facilities shall, whenever 
possible, provide this area. 
(e) Victims are entitled to restitution or reparations, including medical 
costs, as provided in Title 63, Chapter 25a, Criminal Justice and Sub-
stance Abuse, and Sections 62A-7-122, 77-38a-302, and 77-27-6. State and 
local government agencies that serve victims have the duty to have a 
functional knowledge of the procedures established by the Utah Crime 
Victims' Reparations Board and to inform victims of these procedures. 
(f) Victims and witnesses have a right to have any personal property 
returned as provided in Sections 77-24-1 through 77-24-5. Criminal justice 
agencies shall expeditiously return the property when it is no longer 
needed for court law enforcement or prosecution purposes. 
(g) Victims and witnesses have the right to reasonable employer inter-
cession services, including pursuing employer cooperation in minimizing 
employees' loss of pay and other benefits resulting from their participation 
in the criminal justice process. Officers of the court shall provide these 
services and shall consider victims' and witnesses' schedules so that 
activities which conflict can be avoided. Where conflicts cannot be avoided, 
the victim may request that the responsible agency intercede with 
employers or other parties. 
(h) Victims and witnesses, particularly children, should have a speedy 
disposition of the entire criminal justice process. All involved public 
agencies shall establish policies and procedures to encourage speedy 
disposition of criminal cases. 
(i) Victims and witnesses have the right to timely notice of judicial 
proceedings they are to attend and timely notice of cancellation of any 
proceedings. Criminal justice agencies have the duty to provide these 
notifications. Defense counsel and others have the duty to provide timely 
notice to prosecution of any continuances or other changes that may be 
required. 
(j) Victims of sexual offenses have a right to be informed of their right 
to request voluntary testing for themselves for HIV infection as provided 
in Section 76-5-503 and to request mandatory testing of the convicted 
sexual offender for HIV infection as provided in Section 76-5-502. The law 
enforcement office where the sexual offense is reported shall have the 
responsibility to inform victims of this right. 
(2) Informational rights of the victim under this chapter are based upon the 
victim providing his current address and telephone number to the criminal 
justice agencies involved in the case. 
CHAPTER 38 
RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS ACT 
77-38-3. Notification to victims — Initial notice, election 
to receive subsequent notices — Form of notice 
— Protected victim information [Effective until 
July 1, 2004]. 
(1) Within seven days of the filing of felony criminal charges against a 
defendant, the prosecuting agency shall provide an initial notice to reasonably 
identifiable and beatable victims of the crime contained in the charges, except 
as otherwise provided in this chapter. 
(2) The initial notice to the victim of a crime shall provide information about 
electing to receive notice of subsequent important criminal justice hearings 
listed in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) through (f) and rights under this chapter. 
(3) The prosecuting agency shall provide notice to a victim of a crime for the 
important criminal justice hearings, provided in Subsection*77?Q o£S s 
through (f) which the victim has requested. subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) 
(4) (a) The responsible prosecuting agency may provide initial and subs* 
quent notices in any reasonable manner including telephonically dec" 
tronically, orally, or by means of a letter or form prepared for this vurv>o^ 
(b) In the event of an unforeseen important criminal justice hearing 
listed in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) through (f) for which a victimhS 
requested notice, a good faith attempt to contact the victim by telephone 
shall be considered sufficient notice, provided that the prosecuting agency 
subsequently notifies the victim of the result of the proceeding. 
(5) (a) The court shall take reasonable measures to ensure that its sched-
uling practices for the proceedings provided in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) 
through (f) permit an opportunity for victims of crimes to be notified. 
(b) The court shall also consider whether any notification system that it 
might use to provide notice of judicial proceedings to defendants could be 
used to provide notice of those same proceedings to victims of crimes. 
(6) A defendant or, if it is the moving party, Adult Probation and Parole, 
shall give notice to the responsible prosecuting agency of any motion for 
modification of any determination made at any of the important criminal 
justice hearings provided in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) through (f) in advance of 
any requested court hearing or action so that the prosecuting agency may 
comply with its notification obligation. 
(7) (a) Notice to a victim of a crime shall be provided by the Board of 
Pardons and Parole for the important criminal justice hearing provided in 
Subsection 77-38-2(5)(g). 
(b) The board may provide notice in any reasonable manner, including 
telephonically, electronically, orally, or by means of a letter or form 
prepared for this purpose. 
(8) Prosecuting agencies and the Board of Pardons and Parole are required 
to give notice to a victim of a crime for the proceedings provided in Subsections 
77-38-2(5)(a) through (f) only where the victim has responded to the initial 
notice, requested notice of subsequent proceedings, and provided a current 
address and telephone number if applicable. 
(9) (a) Law enforcement and criminal justice agencies shall refer any 
requests for notice or information about crime victim rights from victims 
to the responsible prosecuting agency. 
(b) In a case in which the Board of Pardons and Parole is involved, the 
responsible prosecuting agency shall forward any request for notice that it 
has received from a victim to the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(10) In all cases where the number of victims exceeds ten, the responsible 
prosecuting agency may send any notices required under this chapter in its 
discretion to a representative sample of the victims. 
(11) (a) A victim's address, telephone number, and victim impact statement 
maintained by a peace officer, prosecuting agency, Youth Parole Authority, 
Division of Youth Corrections, Department of Corrections, and Board of 
Pardons and Parole, for purposes of providing notice under this section, is 
classified as protected as provided in Subsection 63-2-304(10). 
(b) The victim's address, telephone number, and victim impact state-
ment is available only to the following persons or entities in the perfor-
mance of their duties: 
(i) a law enforcement agency, including the prosecuting agency; 
(ii) a victims' right committee as provided in Section 77-37-5; 
(iii) a governmentally sponsored victim or witness program; 
(iv) the Department of Corrections; 
(v) Office of Crime Victims' Reparations; 
(vi) Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice; and 
(vii) the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(12) The notice provisions as provided in this section do not apply to 
misdemeanors as provided in Section 77-38-5 and to important juvenile justice 
hearings as provided in Section 77-38-2. 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
77-38-4, Right to be present and to be heard — Control of 
disruptive acts or irrelevant statements — State-
ments from persons in custody. 
(1) The victim of a crime shall have the right to be present at the important 
criminal or juvenile justice hearings provided in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) 
through (f), the right to be heard at the important criminal or juvenile justice 
hearings provided in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(b), (c), (d), and (f), and, upon 
request to the judge hearing the matter, the right to be present and heard at 
the initial appearance of the person suspected of committing the conduct or 
criminal offense against the victim on issues relating to whether to release a 
defendant or minor and, if so, under what conditions release may occur. 
(2) This chapter shall not confer any right to the victim of a crime to be 
heard: 
(a) at any criminal trial, including the sentencing phase of a capital 
trial under Section 76-3-207 or at any preliminary hearing, unless called 
as a witness; and 
(b) at any delinquency trial or at any preliminary hearing in a minor's 
case, unless called as a witness. 
(3) The right of a victim or representative of a victim to be present at trial 
is subject to Rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall deprive the court of the right to prevent or 
punish disruptive conduct nor give the victim of a crime the right to engage in 
disruptive conduct. 
(5) The court shall have the right to limit any victim's statement to matters 
that are relevant to the proceeding. 
(6) In all cases where the number of victims exceeds five, the court may limit 
the in-court oral statements it receives from victims in its discretion to a few 
representative statements. 
(7) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a victim's right to be heard 
may be exercised at the victim's discretion in any appropriate fashion, 
including an oral, written, audiotaped, or videotaped statement or direct or 
indirect information that has been provided to be included in any presentence 
report. 
(8) If the victim of a crime is a person who is in custody as a pretrial 
detainee, as a prisoner following conviction for an offense, or as a juvenile who 
has committed an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult, or who 
is in custody for mental or psychological treatment, the right to be heard under 
this chapter shall be exercised by submitting a written statement to the court. 
(9) The court may exclude any oral statement from a victim on the grounds 
of the victim's incompetency as provided in Rule 601(a) of Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
110) Except in juvenile court cases, the Constitution may not be construed 
as limiting the existing rights of the prosecution to introduce evidence in 
support of a capital sentence. 


























IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-OOO-









BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 13th day of 
December, 2002, commencing at the hour of 9:15 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR - 8 2003 
'I SALT LAKE COUNTY 
BYRON F. BURMESTER 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
HEIDI A. BUCHI 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
— ! MAY 2 8 2003 
ALAN P SMITH, CSR
 D 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801)266-0320 r o u l e t t e S t a g g 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107 Clerk of the Court 
nRIGINAL ft/s/vft^a i A _4 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MS. BUCHI: Good morning, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
MS. BUCHI: Your Honor, if we could call Montiel, 
No. 21 on your calendar. 
THE COURT: We can. Let's wait a minute until my 
clerk gets back. 
MS. BUCHI: Okay. 
THE COURT: We're on No. 21, Alex Montiel. State of 
Utah vs. Alex Montiel, this is Case No. 02190655—or 6524. 
It's on for final pre-trial. We have a trial on next Monday, 
I believe. 
MS. BUCHI: It is, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Have we got Alex Montiel? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We do, but he says he's 
(inaudible) 
THE COURT: No. What he has to do is come out. 
MS. BUCHI: Your Honor, if I can approach. 
THE COURT: All right. You are Alex Montiel? 
MR. MONTIEL: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. I take it from what you've 
handed me, we're going to trial next Monday? 
MS. BUCHI: We are prepared to, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The State ready? 
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MR. BURMESTER: Yes, your Honor, 
THE COURT: Okay. Counsel and the defendant here at 
9:00 o'clock. You'll have the appropriate attire for Mr. 
Montiel? 
MS. BUCHI: Yes, I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. I want everybody here at 9:30 
because I'll have the jury up here at 10:00 o'clock ready to 
go. 
I have the defendant's proposed instructions and 
prop sed voir dire and if the State has any instructions, they 
can bring them first morning. 
Okay. Anything else we need to talk about in this 
case; 
MS. BUCHI: I don't believe so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: State have anything else? 
MR. BURMESTER: Nothing from the State, your Honor. 
THE COURT: See you at 9:30 on Monday. 
MS. BUCHI: Thank you, your Honor. That's all that 
I have, 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Off the record. 
THE COURT: Ms. Buchi? 
MS. BUCHI: Good morning, your Honor. If we could 
return to the matter of Alex Montiel, we have a resolution. 
THE COURT: What's the plan here? 
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Give me the file back on Mcrtiel, will you please, 
Evelyn? 
What's the reason we're doing this? 
MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, there are a couple of 
reasons. The first is, there are some facts that are—make 
the story not as presentable to th«^  jury and I would rather 
accept the—the lesser plea than run the risk of (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Well, you—well, you've charged him with 
aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, and that—and the 
allegations, as I read the pr' e^ cause statement is that 
the defendant used a firearr, wnich would enhance that, and 
also that he committed a crime with four other persons, which 
would enhance that again. And—and the State wants to drop 
this down to a third-degree felony? 
Well, I don't waive firearms enhancements, folks. 
You plead them, they're stuck unless I'm convinced that there 
was some mistake in pleading. And this probable cause 
statement says that Mr. Montiel produced a gun and held it to 
the victim's head and while he was being—while he was being 
robbed by the rest of them. 
MS. BUCHI: Your Honor, there's also the additional 
reason that Mr. Montiel—Mr. Burmester and I have done prior 
to re-trial with Mr. Montiel, he was interested in knowing if 
there was any offer and I approached Mr. Burmester and we 
talked about it. I guess in terms of judicial economy as 
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well, 
THE COURT: I don't care about judicial economy when 
people are alleged to have used firearms in the commission of 
a crime. I'll take whatever time is necessary to resolve the 
issue properly. 
I'm not going to waive the firearms enhancement. 
Unless you can tell me you don't have any evidence that he 
didn't have a firearm or there wasn't a firearm or your 
witness is lying. 
MR. BURMESTER: No, your Honor. It's just—just a 
matter of weighing—weighing the case. I mean, there are 
facts—that is the story that is told by the—by the 
complaining witness. 
THE COURT: And if it's true, it's a serious crime. 
MR. BURMESTER: Yeah. Absolutely. 
THE COURT: A bunch of guys jumped this guy walking 
down the road and put a gun to his head. 
MR. BURMESTER: Absolutely, your Honor, but there 
are also facts and as—as you're well aware with your many 
years of experience as a trial lawyer, sometimes it's better 
to have the—the verdict in hand than—than two in the bush. 
And there's sometimes that the jury may just say, oh, to heck 
with this and—and they lose it. 
I think this person is a dangerous person. My 
objective, I think, and my duties to the taxpayers of the 
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1 State is to take this person, who I believe to be a dangerous 
2 person, and lock him up. That is my objective and I think 
3 this is— 
4 THE COURT: Lock him up for zero to five, what kind 
5 of a deal is that? 
6 MR. BURMESTER: It's better than zero to zero, your 
7 Honor, and that's—that's just what I—where I'm at, I'm 
8 (inaudible) 
9 THE COURT: I assume you've run this by Mr. Yocom? 
10 MR. BURMESTER: I've run it by Mr. Morgan. 
11 THE COURT: Is he the one that does those things? 
12 MR. BURMESTER: Yes. There—there is a part 
13 committee, but in the event we have a short-term situation, 
14 then it's— 
15 THE COURT: What does the victim say about this? 
16 MR. BURMESTER: I have not talked to the victim 
17 about this particular one, although I've talked to the victim 
18 previously about offering a second (inaudible) 
19 THE COURT: Remember the case that Justice Wilkins 
20 wrote where he accused the District Attorney's office and the 
21 trial judge of running rampant over victim's rights by not 
22 telling them what's going on and that little fiasco out in 
23 Tooele? I don't think Mr. Yocom wants to have to undergo that 
24 again without at least an opportunity to look at this. I know 
25 I don't. And I'm not (inaudible). We haven't even told—we 
1 haven't even told the person who claims all these things 
2 occurred as to what are you going to do. I think he's 
3 entitled to know. 
4 I'm not going to allow the filing of this amended 
5 Information at this point and I'm not going to accept any plea 
6 to a third-degree felony on the basis of what I've heard. The 
7 case goes to trial Monday. 
8 MR. BURMESTER: Thank you, your Honor. 
9 MS. BUCHI: Thank you, your Honor. 
10 MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, I'm not sure if the 
11 Court cares, here's a witness list and I know the Court is 
12 concerned about that as alleged. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Very good. Thank you. 
14 MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, I just didn't—this case 
15 is not the usual, so I did not prepared proposed voir dire. 
16 I—(inaudible) the Court stocks. 
17 THE COURT: I'm sure we can cover that. Thank you. 
18 MR. BURMESTER: Thank you. 
19 THE COURT: See you Monday. 
20 I (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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